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Abstract:  
Using novel statistical data, the paper analyzes the geographical distribution of Richard Florida’s 
creative class among 445 European cities. The paper demonstrates that size matters, i.e. cities with a 
high proportion of creative class tend to get more creative through attraction of still more creative 
labor. More specifically, the distribution of the European creative class falls into three phases, each 
approximating a rank-size rule, with different exponents (i.e., inequality). The exponent for the 
smallest cities is profoundly more negative than for the middle-sized cities, and this tendency is 
stronger for the creative class than for the general population. Furthermore, the exponent of the 
largest cities is slightly less negative than the middle-sized cities, and this tendency is also stronger 
for the creative class. In order to explain this, the paper presents four propositions about how effects 
of large and small population sizes of cities may be more detrimental to attracting the creative class 
than attracting the population in general. Below a population size of approximately 70,000 
inhabitants, there is a rapid drop of attractiveness to the creative class with decreasing city size. We 
propose that this may be because below this size, cities begin to drop below minimum efficient 
market sizes for particular creative services, below minimum labor market sizes for particular 
creative job types, and below minimum levels of political representation by the creative class. 
Above a European city population size of approximately 1,2 million inhabitants, the attractiveness 
of increasing city size for the creative class drops, and we propose that the creative class may 
respond particularly adversely to urban congestion.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the size distribution of the creative class among European 
cities, and proposes explanations for this distribution.  
Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class (2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2005a; 2005b) 
has made a notable impact in both the policy world and among scholars (e.g. Gertler 
et al., 2002; Andersen and Lorenzen, 2005; forthcoming; Montgomery, 2005; Boyle, 
2006; Raush and Negry, 2006; Weick and Martin, 2006). Very simplified, Florida 
(2002a; 2002b; 2002c) argues that in a globalized economy where innovation 
constitutes competitive advantage, it is possible to analytically identify a component 
of the labor force that, by virtue of its technical, social, and/or artistic creativity 
applied on the job, adds particular economic value. This creative class within the 
labor force has particular preferences for work and private life. In addition to 
preferences for high-quality housing, work empowerment, and specialized 
consumption resembling those of highly-skilled labor, Florida is able to demonstrate 
empirically that the US creative class (which he empirically captures by selected job 
types) prefers to locate in cities with particular high levels of cultural offers, ethnic 
diversity and tolerance towards non-mainstream lifestyles (as captured by an array of 
now somewhat disputed indicators). Florida further claims that as a result of this 
preference-driven pattern of location of the creative class, diverse and ethnically and 
culturally rich cities prosper economically, as innovation-intensive films must pursue 
the creative labor into these cities ⎯ a remarkable reversal of the industrial logic of 
labor-follows-capital. Florida seeks to give credence to this claim by using (even 
more disputed) indicators for regional economic growth, such as proportion of highly 
skilled labor and hi-tech industries (for an overview of the critiques of Florida’s 
argument, see Peck, 2005). 
Regardless of the political and scholarly disagreements of whether and how the 
creative class may be important for regional economic growth, Florida has succeeded 
in demonstrating that a particular and growing group within the labor force has a 
remarkable location pattern. It is to the analysis of this geography of the creative 
class, rather than its alleged economic importance, this paper is devoted.  
Florida (2002) hints that the distribution of the creative class does not only follow the 
preferences of the creative class for cultural offers, ethnic diversity and tolerance, it 
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may also be scale free. In a scale free distribution, cities do not flock around an 
average size of the creative class (as they would in a normal distribution), rather, they 
are organized in a hierarchy where the size of the creative class drops steadily from a 
few cities with high values to still more cities with small values. This is a kind of 
distribution that has been observed for many natural as well as cultural phenomena. 
Famous analyses of such distributions encompass Zip’s (1949) analysis of the 
distribution of words in the English language (a few words score high values (=occur 
very frequently), many more score much lower) and Pareto’s (Reed, 2001) analysis of 
wealth in European populations (20% of the people hold high wealth values while 
80% have relatively low values ⎯ the empirical background for sometimes referring 
to the scale free distribution type as the 80/20 rule). Scale free distributions are 
captured mathematically by estimating the value of each observation as its rank in the 
hierarchy with a given exponent. For example, Zipf (1949) stipulated that  
P(r) = k*r-q
where P(r) is the value (occurrence) of a word in the English language, r is its rank, k 
is a scaling constant, and q is the exponent of the distribution (inverted in the equation 
above, as it has a negative value in the rank-size distribution’s downward sloping 
curve).  
In a population with a scale free distribution of values, the lower the rank of an 
observation the higher its value, scaled in a way that is particular for that particular 
population. In the population, the negative exponent describes the downward slope of 
the scale free distribution: With an exponent of -1, an observation has double the 
value of the observation one rank lower, with an exponent of -2, it has four times the 
value. Because of the relationship between an observation’s value (size) and its rank 
in scale free distributions, they are also called rank-size distributions, and the 
mathematical expression of them is, given the importance of the exponent (the power 
to which an observation’s rank is raised), often called a power law. The general 
explanation for rank-size distributions is Gilbrat’s principle of proportionate growth 
(Sutton, 1997)1: “Rich beget richer” when not only absolute growth, but also growth 
rates, are higher for high values.  
                                          
1 Strictly speaking, that proportionate growth leads to a rank-size distribution is a hypothesis rather than 
a causal explanation: That proportionate growth, ceteris paribus, leads to a rank-size distribution does 
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It may be only a part of a population that is distributed according to the rank-size rule. 
For observations with very small values, growth may be non-proportionate (or growth 
rates may be so neglectable) that these observations conform poorly to the rule. For 
example, the rarest words in the English language are so esoteric that their use is 
random and unpredictable. In statistical analysis, observations that have too small 
values to be a part of the rank-size “system” are often omitted or “cut off” from the 
analysis in order to get a good fit (Yule, 1924). Other populations may contain 
different phases, the distribution of all following rank-size rules, albeit with different 
exponents. For example, among the richest few of Italy’s population, wealth may 
beget more wealth in a much more dramatic way than is the case for the middle class. 
For such distributions, scholars should not seek to cut off observations that do not fit 
to the rank-size rule, but in stead find the transitions between the phases with different 
exponents. 
In economic geography, a great many phenomena are rank-size distributed, but 
without doubt, the most thoroughly researched (not the least in regional science) is the 
distribution of population among cities (e.g, Richardson, 1973; Rosen and Resnick, 
1980; Caroll, 1982). Economic geographers (e.g., Simon, 1955; Krugman, 1996a) 
typically also evoke proportionate growth in order to explain urban hierarchies with 
rank-size distributions: The growth rate of a city population is assumed to be higher 
the larger the city size, and the more pronounced this tendency, the more negative the 
exponent in the urban rank-size distribution. In an urban hierarchy, the value of the 
exponent depends upon the extent to which the bigger cities develop more specialized 
urban functions (service offer and job types)(Criställer, 1933) and invest in 
infrastructures creating advanced job options and educational opportunities, attracting 
still higher numbers of immigrants. Economic geography has devoted special 
analytical attention to the top and the bottom of the distribution of population among 
cities.  In some such distributions ⎯ for instance, in small or developing economies 
⎯ the one or few biggest cities have economical and possibly political primacy, 
monopolizing public administration, universities and inward investments to such an 
extent that they are propelled beyond the proportionate growth pattern in the rest of 
those economies’ urban hierarchy (Richardson, 1973; Henderson, 1988; Ades & 
                                                                                                                       
not imply that every real life rank-size distribution is caused by proportionate growth. However, 
proportionate growth is by far the dominant hypothesis.   
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Glaeser, 1995; Krugman, 1996b; Moomaw and Shatter, 1996). The population of 
primary cities may hence not conform to the rank-size rule (in which case scholars 
will exclude them from statistical analysis), or they may follow a rank-size rule with a 
different (i.e., more negative) exponent than the rest of the city hierarchy. Concerning 
the bottom of a distribution of cities, it is an important question whether there is a 
minimum city size under which cities drop out of the rank size hierarchy. Simon 
(1955) suggests that when there is such a minimum size in a distribution of cities, 
scholars should cut off the observations below the threshold in order to calculate the 
exponent of the urban hierarchy, but also provide a viable theory of the rank-size 
system’s “birth rate”: How and when the smallest cities grow above the size threshold 
and become a part of the urban hierarchy. 
Florida’s suggestion of a rank-size distribution of the creative class is hence 
somewhat uncontroversial to most economic geographers: “Creative begets more 
creative”, as cities with a higher number of creative people are particularly good in 
attracting more creative people. Together with Robert Axtell (Axtell, 2001; Axtell and 
Florida, 2006), Florida has since dedicated attention to exploring the micro-
foundations of proportionate city growth, applying mathematical modeling in order to 
(successfully) test if a model assuming agglomeration and proportionate growth of the 
creative class can produce a rank-size distribution. However, there has been little 
empirical investigation of the questions we address in this paper: 
a. Whether the creative class is indeed rank-size distributed;  
b. Whether the distribution is continuous or exhibit phases that conform more 
poorly to the rank-size rule or have different exponents, and if so, why; 
c. Whether the tendency to proportionate growth and urban inequality (as 
measured by the exponent) is different from the general population and if so, 
why.  
One reason for the lack of such empirical research is that a thorough investigation of 
the distribution of the creative class among cities takes a significant number of 
observations (Thomas, 1985). Florida (2002) operating in the USA, includes 268 
cities in his survey. 
This paper draws upon an integrated database of 445 cities across 8 European 
countries, and hence, it can set out to address the questions above. It investigates the 
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size distribution of the creative class and compares it to the size distribution of the 
general population among European cities, and it proposes possible explanations for 
this distribution. In its analysis, the paper initially confirms that the distribution of the 
European creative class follows a rank-size rule, and suggests that cities with a large 
size of the creative class tend to get more creative through attraction of still more 
creative labor. The paper suggests consumer preferences and social networks as 
explanations for the proportionate growth of the creative class. Subsequently, the 
paper looks into three distinct phases of the distribution of the European creative 
class, each approximating a rank-size rule with different exponents. The paper 
explains these phases and their exponents by presenting four propositions about how 
effects of large and small population sizes of cities may be more detrimental to the 
creative class than to the population in general. The 147 smallest cities have a 
particularly high negative exponent. We propose that this may be because below this 
size, cities begin to drop below minimum efficient market sizes for particular creative 
services, below minimum labor market sizes for particular creative job types, and 
below minimum levels of political representation by the creative class. The exponent 
for the largest 15 cities has a less negative value than the 283 middle-sized cities. In 
order to explain this, we propose that the creative class may respond particularly 
adversely to urban congestion problems. 
The paper is structured thus. The next section presents our analysis of the rank-size 
distribution of the European class, and proposes an explanation for why the size of 
creative class in a city grows proportionally to city size. The paper’s third section 
analyses in more detail the different phases of the rank-size distribution and compares 
them to the distribution of the general population. The section proposes four 
mechanisms causing the negative value of the exponent of the smallest cities to be 
above that of the rest of the distribution, and the exponent of the largest cities to be 
below. The paper is rounded off by a brief discussion and conclusion section. 
 
2. Rank and Size in the Distribution of the European Creative Class 
The paper uses an original database of the population, the creative class, and a variety 
of indicators of diversity, cultural offer, tolerance, and economic performance, in the 
445 NUTS 4 city regions in 8 countries in Europe at comparable levels of economic 
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development: Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK.2 For definitions of how we measure the size of the creative 
class and other variables, see appendix 1. 
 
The Distribution of the European Creative Class 
Figure 1 below shows the distribution of the creative class among the 445 European 
cities in the year 2000. The figure shows a graph where the logarithm of the size of 
the creative class of each city is plotted against the logarithm of the rank of the city. 
On such a log-log plot, a pure rank-size distribution will show as a straight line, with 
the exponent revealed as the slope of the line (for information on calculation of the 
plots used in the paper, see appendix 2). 
Figure 1: The rank-size distribution of the European creative class (2000)  
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Slope coefficient: -1,459 
Adjusted R2: 0,668 
N: 445 
 
                                          
2 The database was designed and collected 2003-2007 under the research project Talent, Technology 
and Tolerance in European Cities: A Comparative Analysis, by 8 European partner universities. The 
cross-country collaboration was coordinated by Björn Asheim (Lund University), and Mark Lorenzen 
(Copenhagen Business School) managed the Danish project. 
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The figure confirms that the European creative class is distributed according to a 
rank-size rule, albeit the fit to the rule is not very impressive, with a R2 of 0,668. The 
exercise prescribed by rank-size scholars and outlined in the previous section, cutting 
off the lower tail of the distribution in order to get a better fit, yields a R2 of 0,839, but 
as this excludes more than half of the cities (247) from the representation, it cannot be 
said to be a very satisfactory solution. It makes much better sense to represent the 
distribution of the European creative class as three phases, each rank-size distributed, 
but with different exponents. Figure 2 below shows the distribution of the European 
creative class split up thus.  
 
Figure 2: Phases of the rank-size distribution of the European creative class 
(2000) 
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Each phase in figure 2 has a remarkably good fit to a perfect rank-size rule: The phase 
consisting of the 15 cities with the largest sizes of the creative class has a R2 of 0,853, 
the phase of the 283 middle-sized cities has a R2 of 0,920, and the R2 of the phase of 
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the 147 smallest cities is 0,930. The second row in table 1 below lists each phase’s 
exponent, fit to the rank-size rule, number of cities included, plus the size of the 
population and the creative class in the lower threshold city, i.e. where we chose to 
distinguish the phase from the next in order to obtain the best fit. 
 
Table 1: Exponents, fit, and thresholds of phases of the rank-size distributions of 
the European creative class, population, and bohemians (2000) 
 
 Top phase Middle phase Bottom phase 
General population Exponent: -0,380 
Fit (R2): 0,967 
N: 26 
Lower threshold: Hampshire, 
with a population of 
1,244,700 
 
Exponent: -1,169 
Fit (R2): 0,888 
N: 293 
Lower threshold: Tromsø, 
with a population of 73,673 
Exponent: -7,428 
Fit (R2): 0,886 
N: 124 
 
Creative class total Exponent: -0,245 
Fit (R2): 0,853 
N: 15 
Lower threshold: Helsinki, 
with a population of 
1,207,737  
(276,555 members of 
creative class) 
Exponent: -1,036 
Fit (R2): 0,920 
N: 283 
Lower threshold: Porvoo, 
with a population of 72,295  
(12,064 members of creative 
class) 
Exponent: -9,482 
Fit (R2): 0,930 
N: 147 
 
Bohemians Exponent: -0,74 
Fit (R2): 0,942 
N: 38 
Lower threshold: Mittleler 
Oberrheim, with a population 
of 987,500  
(6,005 bohemians) 
Exponent: -1,502 
Fit (R2): 0,936 
N: 281 
Lower threshold: 
Kristianstad, with a 
population of 101,060  
(267 bohemians) 
Exponent: -14,849 
Fit (R2): 0,922 
N: 126 
 
 
 
Hence, we can claim that in general, the European class is indeed distributed 
according to the rank-size rule. If we accept the proportionate growth hypothesis as 
explanation for rank-size distributions, we may conclude that creative European cities 
indeed beget more creative: The larger a city’s size of creative population, the more 
the creative population grows. Before the paper proceeds to query into the differences 
between the three phases of the distribution, let us briefly discuss possible 
explanations for this overall proportional growth.   
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The Creative Ethos and Proportionate Growth 
One explanation for the proportional growth of the European creative class may be 
that it is attracted to the specialized urban services and infrastructures arising with a 
high creative class presence ⎯ for example, non-mainstream cultural offers and 
specialized research and education institutions. The growing attractiveness of larger 
cities is even more pronounced for a special subgroup within the creative class, which 
Florida (2002b; 2002c) calls bohemians. This subgroup (constituted by e.g. artists, 
designers, and writers) is more engaged in applying artistic forms of creativity than 
Florida’s two other subgroups:  The creative core (e.g. researchers, engineers, and 
doctors), applying mostly technical creativity; the creative professionals (e.g. 
managers, finance people, and lawyers), mainly applying creativity in a generic and 
managerial sense (for more detailed definitions, see appendix 1). Whereas the creative 
professionals is the largest subgroup, the creative core has the highest skill levels and 
accounts for most of the economic value produced by the creative class. However, 
even if the bohemians are relatively few and account for only a modest part of the 
creative class’ economic growth, according to Florida, this group is the most critical 
consumers of urban services with the most specialized preferences, and is pioneering 
the preferences of the creative class in general. Drawing upon e.g. Brooks (2001) and 
Robinson and Godbey (1997), Florida (2002) claims that technically and socially 
creative people to a growing extent identify themselves with artists. Thus, aspects of 
the preferences of the bohemians disseminate to the rest of the creative class, creating 
its “bourgeoisie-bohemian” ⎯ or, affectionately, “bobo” (Brooks, 2001) ⎯ ethos.  
Our data support Florida’s claim in this respect. As illustrated in table 1 above, the 
exponent of the bohemians (for all three phases) is much higher than for the rest of the 
creative class. This is an indication that bohemians are more sensible to city size than 
the total creative class, and a suggestion that the proportional growth of the 
bohemians is greater. Florida (2002b; 2002c) compares the bohemians to “a canary in 
the coalmine”: Due to its preferences for consuming even more specialized services 
that the rest of the creative class, this group is the first to shy cities with a poor service 
offer. If we look at the rank-size graph of the distribution of the bohemians among the 
European cities, as shown in figure 3 below, it shows the same tendency as the total 
creative class (as shown in figure 1 earlier), but it has an even more dramatic drop-off 
below a certain city rank. 
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 Figure 3: The rank-size distribution of European bohemians (2000) 
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Slope coefficient: -1,777 
Adjusted R2: 0,660 
N: 445 
Social Networks and Proportionate Growth 
Another explanation for the creative class’ high proportional growth can be found in 
network theory (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992; Barabasi et al, 2000; 
Barabási, 2002; Watts et al, 2002). This theory is also concerned with proportional 
growth ⎯ that of networks. It suggests an explanation of proportionate growth of 
networks, namely preferential attachment of new links to nodes in networks: The 
nodes with most pre-existing links to other nodes are strongest in attracting new links 
(Barabási, 2002).  
We may explain the proportionate growth of the creative class in cities by considering 
one category of networks, social networks ⎯ i.e., where network nodes are people, 
and network links consist of social relations. Ceteris paribus, the larger the population 
of a city, the more social relations it will have to outside people. As immigration to a 
city is often proportional to the number of social relations between its inhabitants and 
potential immigrants (Gans, 1962; Tilly, 1990; Granovetter, 1995; Portes, 1995; Gold, 
2001), bigger cities with more social networks attract most immigrants. In this social 
network perspective, the reason the creative class has a high proportional growth is 
that it is very networked. People involved in creative work (whether in technical, 
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social or artistic senses) benefit immensely from participating in numerous social 
networks, and the most creative people are often the nodes in social networks with 
most links (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005, Powell et al., 2005).  The fact that much creative 
work is also organized in temporary projects (Lorenzen and Frederiksen, 2005) 
enhances the tendency of the creative class to participate to complex and shifting 
value chains and networks. As creative people often both socialize and collaborate 
professionally with other creative people, the rich social networks of the creative class 
have immense potential for attracting more creative people. 
The growth of the number of members of the creative class in a city may not just be 
due to immigration, it may also be because people simply shift job type into the 
creative class category ⎯  for example, when a IT engineer is hired by a big 
corporation to do development work in stead of maintenance, when a graduate starts 
his own company, or when somebody finally realizes his artistic aspirations by getting 
his manuscript published. For this type of creative class growth, the importance of 
social networks also causes significant proportionate growth of the bigger cities: 
Cities with more networks yield most entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1995; Casson and Giusta, 2007). 
 
3. Market Size, the Creative Environment, and Congestion  
We shall now take a closer look at the three different phases of distribution of the 
European creative class. As listed in table 1, they exhibit remarkably different 
exponents. The most striking feature of the distribution is the high exponent of the 
cities with the smallest size of the creative class: Nine times the exponent of the 
middle phase, and 39 times that of the top phase. For the smallest cities, there seem to 
be very large adverse effects of having a small creative class. Another evident feature 
in the distribution of the creative class among European cities is that it shows no 
urban primacy.3 Rather than the S-shape of urban hierarchies with primacy (Stewart, 
1958; Vapharsky 1969; Rosen and Resnick, 1980; Caroll 1982), figure 1 shows that 
the largest cities in fact slightly underperform compared to the rest of the distribution. 
                                          
3 That the distribution shows no urban primacy is not surprising, given the data base integrates city data 
for 8 European countries. This blurs the effects of potential urban primacy within each country. 
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For these cities, the positive attraction effects of increasing size of the creative class 
are not as profound as for the rest of the distribution.  
The present section of the paper is devoted to explaining these different exponents of 
the smallest and the largest cities. Our explanations all rest upon mechanisms related 
to general population size ⎯  i.e., the total number of inhabitants in cities (including, 
of course,  the creative class, but also the rest of the labor force plus those outside the 
labor force). We have calculated the distribution of the general population of the 445 
European cities, and the results are also presented in table 1. The distribution 
generally resembles that of the creative class, and is also best represented as three 
phases each with good fit to a rank-size rule (the R2 for the fit of the whole 
distribution to the rank-size rule is only 0,723, compared to the much better fits if we 
split it into the phases listed in table 1). Table 1 shows that the creative class’ 
tendencies to drop off in small and large city populations sizes can also be found for 
the general population: The bottom phase (the smallest cities) has much the highest 
negative exponent, and the top phase (the largest cities) a slightly less negative 
exponent than the middle-sized cities phase. As illustrated in figure 4 below, this is 
not a coincidence: The size of the creative class also generally co-varies with 
population size. 
Figure 4: The correlation between the European population and creative class 
(2000) 
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Slope coefficient: 5,633 
Adjusted R2: 0,887 
N: 445 
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The correlation between the population and the creative class, and their similar 
distributions of growth patterns, suggest that population size and growth patterns 
influence creative class size and growth patterns: In general, the European cities with 
the largest general populations attract the most creative class. Given the explanations 
for proportionate growth of the creative class outlined in the previous sections of the 
paper, it is not surprising that a city’s population size and growth are positively 
correlated with its size and growth of the creative class: The city functions and 
infrastructures in cities with large populations are bound to attract the creative class as 
well as the general population, and the abundance of social networks in large cities 
also positively influence the immigration and entrepreneurial opportunities of both the 
general population and the creative class. This also means that the adverse growth 
effects for the cities with the smallest and largest general populations influence the 
growth of the creative class. In fact, it can be argued that such effects translate very 
directly from the general population to the creative class. Quite remarkably, the city 
sizes of the phase transitions are remarkably similar. The population of the threshold 
cities (where distinguishing the phases from each other provided the best rank-size 
fits) are roughly the same for the general population and the creative class: The 
transition from the top phase to the middle phase phase takes place around 
approximately 1.2 million inhabitants for both the creative class and the general 
population, and they share a shift to the bottom phase around 70,000 inhabitants. 
However, with a coefficient of 0,887, the correlation in figure 4 is not perfect. This is, 
as can be seen in table 1, because even if the general population and the creative class 
both have a higher exponent for the bottom phase and a lower exponent for the top 
phase, the tendency of the distribution to dropping off at both ends is more profound 
for the creative class. The negative exponent for the bottom cities is higher for the 
creative class than for the general population, and the exponent for the top cities is 
slightly less negative. The differences in exponents suggest that even if the size and 
growth of the creative class co-varies with the size and growth of the general 
population, and even if the adverse growth effects of the smallest and the largest cities 
set in around the same city population size for both the general population and the 
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creative class, the diseconomies of small and large city population sizes are greater 
for the creative class than for the general population. 
The difference in diseconomies is greatest for the smallest cities: From the middle 
phase to the bottom phase, the negative exponent of the creative class distribution 
grows 815%, compared to 535% for the general population. For what this is worth as 
illustration, table 1 hence lists adverse effects of small population size for the creative 
class that are 1.52 times those of the general population. However, a difference in 
diseconomies is also traceable for the largest cities: For the creative class, the 
exponent drops 76 % from the middle phase to the top phase ⎯  an effect 1.13 that of 
the general population (the exponent of which drops 67%). 
In the remainder of this section, we present four propositions about mechanisms 
related to the size of the general population, in order to explain such diseconomies of 
small and large city sizes. We first turn to the smaller cities. In the following, we 
present three propositions about different types of diseconomies of small city 
populations ⎯ two based upon economic considerations, the third resting upon logics 
from political economy. 
 
Market Size and Creative Services 
We may explain the diseconomies of smaller cities by reconsidering a classic 
economic notion: The degree of any type of economic specialization is limited by the 
extent of the market for it (Smith, 1776). Put differently, any product, service, or job 
will be offered only if it has enough buyers (i.e., interested consumers or qualified 
job-seekers). In the formative years of economic geography, Criställer (1933) adopted 
this insight in his notion of a threshold for urban functions, i.e., the minimum number 
of city inhabitants needed to support the offering of a service or good. Adopting 
Smith’s (1776) and Criställer’s (1933) insights, we shall argue that because there are 
minimum efficient market sizes for particular services and job types, there are city 
size thresholds below which creative people cannot find the services they demand, or 
the jobs they are qualified to do. Attractiveness to the creative class falls particularly 
rapidly with city size in the bottom phase of the distribution, because it is in this phase 
many of the market size thresholds are found. 
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In the following, we will first discuss the size threshold for city services, focusing 
upon those that may have a particular importance for the creative class. Subsequently, 
we will turn our attention to the size threshold for creative job types that are of 
particular relevance to the creative class. 
First, considering creative services, we propose that in the bottom city phase, we find 
many of the market size thresholds for creative services: Many cities here have too 
few inhabitants to constitute sufficient consumer bases to sustain the specialized 
services demanded by the creative class. Let us exemplify which services we are 
talking about. In a recent survey of the Danish creative class’ consumption of cultural 
offers (Andersen and Lorenzen, forthcoming)4, the creative class is shown to consume 
less spectator sports than the rest of the work force, and resemble it with respect to 
culture consumed at home (such as TV, video, recorded music, computer games, and 
magazines) and consumption of mainstream public culture (such as cinema, zoo, 
theme parks and evening classes). However, when it comes to more specialized public 
culture offers, the survey shows that the creative class has a significantly different 
consumption pattern, as shown in table 2 below.  
Table 2: Cultural Offers Consumed by the Danish Creative Class, 2004 
 Cultural Offer Estimated parameter for the creative class 
(positive likelihood relative to benchmark group) 
 
Attend classical concerts 
Visit art exhibitions 
Visit art museums 
Perform arts, such as music, dancing, or acting 
Visit libraries 
Visit museums 
Visit heritage sites 
Visit landscapes  
Visit historical architectures 
Go to the theatre 
Do city walks  
Walk/bike in nature or to work 
Participate to sports 
Attend rock/jazz concerts 
 
0,99 
0,81 
0,78 
0,63 
0,63 
0,62 
0,58 
0,52 
0,48 
0,39 
0,31 
0,31 
0,30 
0,26 
Source: Trine Bille, as published in Andersen and Lorenzen (forthcoming). 
Note: The survey is based upon another data base than the current paper, and the creative class is hence defined somewhat 
differently, emphasizing technical and artistic creativity. This approximates Florida’s subgroups the creative core plus 
bohemians. 
 
                                          
4 The survey controls its results for the effects of education level, age, gender, income level, and 
geographic location. 
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Table 2 lists how much more likely members of the Danish creative class are to 
consume a range of cultural offers relative to a benchmark group in the labor force 
(constituted by selected service occupations). It can be seen that the creative class is 
by far the most eager consumers of very specialized cultural offers, such as concerts, 
museums, theatre, and city architecture. As such specialized services and cultural 
opportunities demand large consumer bases, they are predominantly found only in 
larger cities. Smaller Danish cities are hence at a notable disadvantage as far attracting 
the creative class on the basis of cultural offers is concerned. 
Figure 5 illustrates that there are minimum efficient market sizes for cultural offers in 
Europe. It presents the European cities’ distribution of an index for cultural offer 
(based on its number of employed within cultural services ⎯ for a more detailed 
definition, see appendix 1). 
Figure 5: The rank-size distribution of European cities’ cultural offer (2000) 
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Slope coefficient: -1,444 
Adjusted R2: 0,725 
N: 420 
 
Note: The database does not contain data on cultural opportunities in Switzerland. Thus, the Swiss city regions are excluded 
(N=420). 
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Evidently, we are talking about one more rank-size distribution here, and also one 
with three phases with different exponents. The exponents, fits and thresholds of the 
phases we get by dividing the distribution are presented in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Exponents, fit, and thresholds of phases of the European cities’ cultural 
offer (2000) 
 
 Top phase Middle phase Bottom phase 
Cultural offer index Exponent: -0,451 
Fit (R2): 0,933 
N: 32 
Lower threshold: Cheshire, 
with a population of 675,300  
 
Exponent: -1,295 
Fit (R2): 0,917 
N: 262 
Lower threshold: Nyköping, 
with a population of 80,820 
Exponent: -8,149 
Fit (R2): 0,948 
N: 126 
 
 
 
If we compare table 3 to table 1, we can see that the distribution of cultural offer shifts 
into a bottom phase around the same threshold as the general population and the 
creative class: For cities smaller than 80,000 inhabitants, the distributions begins to 
slope with a high negative exponent. This lends credit to our proposition that the cities 
in the bottom phase begin to drop under minimum efficient market sizes for the offer 
of particular cultural services. The drop of cultural services has an exponent higher 
than the drop of the general population, which may contribute to explaining the even 
steeper exponent of the creative class in the bottom phase: They respond more 
adversely to decline in cultural offer than the general population. However, the effects 
are much more profound for the “canary in the coalmine”, the bohemians. As listed in 
table 1, their size in the bottom cities has the most dramatic rapid drop-off of all 
population groups, with a negative exponent much higher than the total creative class 
and almost double that of the general population. The drop-off of cultural services 
offer may help to explain this: The bohemians are arguably the keenest consumers of 
cultural offers (Florida, 2002b; 2002c). They are also the least tolerant to small city 
sizes: The threshold for bohemians entering the bottom phase is a population size of 
approximately 100,000 inhabitants ⎯ 25,000 more than the city size where the 
distributions of the general population and the total creative class exhibit adverse 
attraction effects of decreasing city size. That the strong drop-off of bohemians takes 
place around a larger city size than the size where the strong drop-off of cultural 
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services takes place, suggests that while cultural offers matter, there are other factors 
influencing the bohemians’ distribution.5  
 
Market Size and Creative Jobs 
Our second proposition applies the logic of the market size threshold to the labor 
market. We propose that in the bottom city phase, we find many of the labor market 
size thresholds for creative job types: Many cities here have too few inhabitants to 
sustain the specialized jobs filled in particular by the creative class. Florida (2002a; 
2002c) points out that the creative class has particular economic importance for hi-
tech industries. Incidentally, hi-tech jobs are also a fine example of job types with a 
notable city population size threshold. Figure 6 below plots the distribution of 
European cities’ number of hi-tech jobs (for a definition of what we included as hi-
tech jobs, see appendix 1). 
                                          
5 It should be noted, however, that the European distribution of cultural offers also show a high 
negative exponent in the middle phase ⎯  an exponent that more resembles that of the middle phase 
exponent of bohemians than those for the general population and the total creative class. That the 
cultural offer begins to decline notably in the middle phase may help to explain the drop-off for 
bohemians around city sizes larger than the rapid drop-off of cultural offer.  
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Figure 6: The rank-size distribution of European cities’ number of hi-tech jobs 
(2000)
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Slope coefficient: -1,680 
Adjusted R2: 0,664 
N: 445 
 
The distribution of hi-tech jobs in European cities follows a rank-size rule and 
demonstrates three phases with different exponents. The exponents, fits and 
thresholds of the phases are presented in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Exponents, fit, and thresholds of phases of the European cities’ number 
of hi-tech jobs (2000) 
 
 Top phase Middle phase Bottom phase 
Hi-tech jobs  Exponent: -0,470 
Fit (R2): 0,976 
N: 26 
Lower threshold: 
Hertfordshire, with a 
population of 1,037,200  
 
Exponent: -1,500 
Fit (R2): 0,919 
N: 319 
Lower threshold: Randers, 
with a population of 112,611 
Exponent: -17,0605 
Fit (R2): 0,918 
N: 100 
 
 
A comparison of table 4 to table 1 shows that the distribution of hi-tech jobs shifts 
into a bottom phase with a exponent much higher than the bottom phase of the 
population, lending support to our proposition that the creative class exhibits a steeper 
20 
drop-off of smaller cities’ attractiveness because the creative class responds more 
adversely to decline in the number of hi-tech jobs than the general population. It is 
also evident from a comparison of tables 4 and 1 that the threshold city population 
size where the bottom phase sets in is around 110.000 inhabitants, much higher for hi-
tech jobs than the cultural offer discussed above. Hence, the minimum efficient 
market size for the offer of hi-tech jobs is higher than for cultural services. Below 
110.000 inhabitants, these job types disappear with an exponent so high that we may 
effectively talk about a Criställer-type of threshold for this urban function.  
While the rapidly declining presence of hi-tech jobs in smaller cities may partly 
explain these cities‘ decline in attractiveness to the creative class, it should be noted 
that the drop-off of hi-tech jobs takes place for cities with approximately 40,000 more 
inhabitants more than where the creative class starts to shy them. Our example of hi-
tech jobs is hence only part of the story. There are many other specialized job types 
that may disappear with declining city size and effect the distribution of the creative 
class more than the general population. 
 
Population Size and Creative Environment 
We shall now supplement our propositions of the roles of minimum market sizes with 
a proposition about a somewhat different mechanism related to city population size. 
Our third proposition about diseconomies of small cities is that small cities may have 
a less creative environment. Florida (2002c; 2005a) argues repeatedly that cities that 
are most attractive to the creative class, apart from being diverse, rich in cultural 
offers, and tolerant, also boast a creative “environment”. Focusing upon measuring 
the attraction of diversity, cultural offer, and tolerance, Florida is however remarkably 
vague on what a creative environment consists of. For the purpose of the analysis in 
this paper, we shall define a creative environment as the use of public resources in 
ways that allow for and stimulate creativity. We shall assume that a creative 
environment comes about when the creative class influences professional and public 
decision-making, and proxy a such influence with a high share of the creative class of 
the local work force. Ceteris paribus, the higher such share, the more does the creative 
class constitute a part of professional, everyday, and political life in such cities, and 
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the more political decisions ⎯ about the use of public spaces, funds, and other 
resources⎯ will accommodate the creative ethos. 
We already know that the number of members of the creative class in a city is 
generally correlated with the city’s general population size. But, as shown in figure 7 
below, the share of the creative class in a city’s labor force exhibits a different 
behavior: After declining along with population rank, the share of creative class drops 
off suddenly for smaller cities. 
Figure 7: The correlation of European city population rank and share of creative 
class (2000) 
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Slope coefficient: -0,057 
Adjusted R2: 0,360 
N: 445 
 
Figure 7 shows the European cities, ranked by population size, plotted against how 
big a share (in percent) of their resident labor force is constituted by the creative 
class.6  The figure shows two tendencies, one for low rank numbers (i.e., the largest 
cities), and one for cities with ranks higher than 400 (i.e., the smallest cities). For the 
largest cities, there is quite some divergence of their labor forces’ share of creative 
                                          
6 The reason for presenting the correlation between cities’ shares of the creative class and their 
population ranks ⎯ and not sizes ⎯ is pragmatic. The correlation between population size and share of 
the creative class has a much lower correlation coefficient. This is due to the different scales ⎯  e.g. 
there might be a great difference in size between the city with rank 1 and the city with rank 10 but only 
a small difference in size between the city with rank 101 and 110.  
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class: Even if the share of creative class generally declines slowly the higher the city 
rank number, cities of approximately the same size boast quite different creative class 
shares. For cities with ranks above 400, corresponding to population sizes below 
approximately 25,000, their size is very determining for their share of the creative 
class: There is a very strong correlation between a high city rank number and a small 
creative class share, and no labor force in a city smaller than 25,000 people boasts 
more than 10% creative class. 
Figure 7 hence suggests that there is a population size threshold for the creative 
class’s share of a city’s labor force. Above the threshold, there is scope for becoming 
creative irrespective of size, and even medium-sized cities may attract high shares of 
creative class to their work forces. Conversely, below this threshold, a city’s labor 
force is very little creative, and cities show an unrelenting tendency to get less 
creative with decreasing population size. In the case of the European cities, the 
population size threshold for a creative share of higher than 10% of a city’s work 
force was approximately 25,000 inhabitants. As the creative class, ceteris paribus, 
looses political influence in the cities smaller than this threshold, some of these cities 
may slowly accumulate adverse political decisions from creative people’s point of 
view, and hence develop weak creative environments. 
After dedicating attention to the three above propositions regarding diseconomies of 
small city size, we shall now turn to explaining the diseconomies of the largest cities. 
 
Size and Congestion 
Our proposition to explain the less negative exponent of the cities with the largest 
populations evokes a classical theme in economic geography: These cities are subject 
to diseconomies of scale in the guise of urban congestion problems. While there are 
scale economies of urban infrastructures up to a certain point, the largest cities, which 
are also the cities with highest growth rates, may be chronically behind with respect to 
investing in basic infrastructures. Ironically, the most populated cities that have 
managed to develop world-class specialized urban functions and infrastructures such 
as universities and airports, are sometimes lacking in basic infrastructures, such as 
public transport capacity and pollution (and sometimes also crime) control. Even 
more importantly, housing prices and other living costs grow disproportionately in 
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large cities with high growth rates. As argued by Colby (1933), Myrdal (1957), and 
Hirschman (1958), such urban congestion serves to spread or “centrifuge” growth 
from large cities.  
Colby (1933), Myrdal (1957), and Hirschman (1958) all argued that strong congestion 
would generally spin growth off large cities, but later research has shown that such 
centrifugal forces may be operating more selectively (for a discussion, see Gaile, 
1980). We shall propose that centrifugal forces are at play in the distribution of the 
European creative class, because even if such forces act upon the general population 
as well as the creative class, the latter is more prone to respond to them. This can be 
seen quite clearly in table 1: While the transition to the top phase with less negative 
exponent takes place around the same city size for the general population and the 
creative class, approximately 1.2 million inhabitants, the slope in the top phase is less 
steep for the creative class. This lower negative exponent of the top phase indicates 
that congestion effects in the largest cities counteract the growing attractiveness with 
city size most for the creative class. The reason is that the creative class, having 
higher average incomes  (Florida 2002c; 2005) and more frequently working in 
temporary projects and shifting work places (Lorenzen and Frederiksen, 2005), is 
more mobile than the general population.    
The bohemians again stand out as a special group within the creative class. While the 
curve in their top phase has a steeper slope than the general population has in its top 
phase, it is less steep than the total creative class. This suggests that the bohemians 
respond more to congestion than the general population, but less than the rest of the 
creative class. The reason is likely to be that the bohemians are less affected by 
congestion in the guise of housing prices as some of them tend to live in cheaper 
housing in large cities’ bohemian neighborhoods, but also that they have much lower 
income levels, and hence mobility, than the rest of the creative class (Andersen and 
Lorenzen, forthcoming). Table 1 also shows that while not being able to respond so 
profoundly to congestion, the bohemians however have a lower tolerance towards it: 
The threshold city population around where the bohemians begins to shy large cities 
is approximately 990,000, around a quarter of a million inhabitants fewer than for the 
both the general population and the total creative class. 
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 4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The paper analyzed the rank-size distribution of creative class among 445 European 
cities. It answered its research questions thus: 
a. The European creative class is indeed rank-size distributed;  
b. The distribution of the European creative class exhibits three phases with 
different exponents, due to diseconomies of small and large city sizes;  
c. Compared to the general population, the tendency of proportionate growth of 
the European creative class shows 1.52 times more the disadvantage (higher 
negative exponent) of declining city size for the phase of cities with fewer 
than 70,000 inhabitants, and 1.13 less pronounced advantage (less negative 
exponent) of growing city size for the phase of cities with more than 1.2 
million inhabitants. 
In order to explain the differences between the three phases of the distribution, the 
paper argued that the detrimental growth effects of small and large city population 
sizes are more profound for the creative class than for the general population, and 
developed four general propositions on how population size influences the creative 
class:  
P1. The creative class may suffer from a lack of particular creative services in 
cities with too small populations to constitute viable consumer bases for such 
services. We exemplified this for the European case by pointing out that 
cultural offers of European cities are also distributed according to a rank-size 
rule, with cities with fewer than approximately 80,000 inhabitants exhibiting a 
rapid drop-off of cultural offers.  
P2. The creative class may suffer from a lack of creative job types in cities with 
too small populations to constitute viable labor markets for such job types. We 
illustrated this for the European case by showing that hi-tech jobs are also 
rank-size distributed in Europe, with cities with fewer than approximately 
110,000 inhabitants rapidly dropping below viable labor market sizes for such 
jobs. 
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P3. The creative class may shy cities with small populations because of their less 
creative environments, arising from a lack of political representation by the 
creative class. We exemplified this for the European case by demonstrating 
that the creative class significantly loses its share of the local labor force in 
cities below approximately 25,000 inhabitants.  
P4. The creative class may respond particularly adversely to urban congestion in 
cities with large populations. We illustrated this for the European case by 
pointing out that when a city’s population is larger than approximately 1.2 
million inhabitants, the slope (exponent) showing the proportional growth of 
cities flattens more for the creative class than for the general populations. 
From a policy angle, our propositions are novel in the sense that they suggest that the 
appropriate strategy for improving a city’s attractiveness to the creative class depends 
much upon the size of that city. The smallest cities are extremely vulnerable to size 
effects: A decline of the number of inhabitants is very detrimental to attractiveness to 
the creative class, and a primary concern of the smallest cities could be to coordinate 
efforts and collaborate in order to constitute more viable consumer and labor markets 
for the services and jobs that are most attractive to the creative class. The smallest 
cities that want to attract more of the creative class should also be careful not to 
allocate public resources in ways that render them still less attractive to this 
component of the labor force, even if it has low levels of political representation. The 
attractiveness of middle-sized cities is also dependent upon their population size, but 
with the lower exponent in this phase of cities, there is greater scope for these cities 
for experimenting with designing more unique profiles in order to attract the creative 
class. The cities with most inhabitants have by far the greatest advantage with respect 
to attracting the creative class. However, if the very largest cities should not erode this 
advantage, a primary concern is to manage their population growth without lowering 
their attractiveness to the creative class ⎯ through investing in appropriate public 
transport capacity, pollution and crime control, and allowing for a diverse offer of 
housing that accommodates a diverse population, including the creative class and the 
other population groups who contributes to the cities’ ethnic and cultural diversity and 
environment. 
The paper complements the work of Florida (2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2005a; 2005b) in 
several ways. First and foremost, it presents a large-scale analysis of the rank-size 
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distribution of the creative class. Regardless of the debate around the problem of 
urban hierarchies and scale free distributions alleged to by, amongst others, Florida 
(2002c), the analysis presented in this paper is the first of its kind. Based on data for 
445 cities (as compared to Florida’s (2002c) 268 observations), it suggests that while 
the creative class follows the rank-size rule, it does do in different phases, and these 
phases show more dramatic differences than the phases of the distribution of the 
general population. Two of the explanations we propose rest on large city congestion 
and small cities’ less creative environment, respectively. However, our two remaining 
propositions are more controversial as they touch upon a classic theoretical dilemma 
in economic geography: The relationship between the rank-size argument and the 
central place argument. We point out that even if the European urban hierarchy 
conforms to the rank-size rule, it does not do so as one linear slope with a continuous 
gradient: Below a particular population size, the distribution shifts to a phase with a 
particularly high negative exponent (a higher level of proportionate city growth). The 
transition is very evident for the total creative class, and even more conspicuous for 
the bohemians. Arguing that the transition to a bottom phase is really the sign that 
many small thresholds begin to appear in the urban hierarchy ⎯ those of the 
minimum efficient market sizes for different services and job types ⎯ we introduce 
Criställer’s (1933) argument about urban functions into our rank-size argument. 
However, this is not a full-blown transit to the central place camp: When we talk 
about “threshold”, we mean the transition to a phase with another exponent ⎯ not, as 
Criställer would have it, clearly defined “steps” of cities with similar sizes and offer 
of urban services and job types. It would be unrealistic to think an urban hierarchy 
sports such steps. In stead, we point out that below a particular threshold city size, the 
offers of services and job types fall away with quite some variation, without clear 
steps ⎯ but on average, faster than for cities above the threshold.  
A second addition to the existing literature is, of course, the European context for the 
analysis of the creative class. Even if various analysts (see e.g. Florida, 2005a; 2005b) 
have given European cities and countries various “creative rankings” with respect to 
their proportions of hi-tech labor, cultural offer, diversity, and tolerance, there have 
been no surveys of the European creative class carried out with a scale and detail 
matching that of Florida’s (2002a; 2002c) analysis of the USA, and Gertler et al.’s 
(2002) analysis of Canada. 
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The third contribution of the paper we want to stress here is that it is based upon 
cross-country data. This means that the paper has potential for contributing to the 
literature on the rise of global urban hierarchies. Over the last decades, the discourse 
on urban nodes in global networks (Amin and Thrift, 1994) and the growth of “global 
cities” (Hall, 1998) has gained momentum. Now, with globalization in the guise of 
increased international glows of trade, capital, and people, global urban hierarchies 
may be undergoing changes (Castells 1989; Hall 1998; Soo, 2005). Even if the data 
presented in this paper is not exactly global, it is pioneering in a creative class context 
in integrating data for 8 European countries. This cross-country integration has proved 
valuable for our ability to include the entire population of cities in our analysis: The 
total population of the 445 cities shows no urban primacy that should be cut off7, and 
can also be split up into three phases with very good fit to the rank-size rule, hence 
avoiding a painful cutting off of an “unruly tail” of observations. 
The paper points forward in several respects. Foremost, in order to explain the 
distribution of the European creative class, the paper presents four general 
propositions that should be subjected to future empirical scrutiny. Furthermore, as the 
paper addresses a cross-country urban hierarchy, its considerations and suggestions 
may prove of importance for future analysis of global urban hierarchies, within the 
broader globalization research agenda. Future work based on the same database could, 
of course, encompass an analysis of whether the European urban hierarchy has 
undergone changes during the last decade (apart from, of course, expanding the data 
base).8 Thus, the paper pays homage to a fine scholarly tradition: Of raising more 
questions than it answers. Given the limited scholarly attention dedicated to the 
creative class compared to the policy hype it has received recently, there seems to be 
ample room within economic geography for addressing these and related questions. 
                                          
7 In our data set, Finland and Sweden show some urban primacy, but the combination of data from all 
the countries levels this effect. 
8 The 8 countries in the data base have been carefully selected, so there would be some problems of 
integrating more countries. See appendix 1 for a discussion. 
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 Appendix 1: On the data base and the definitions employed  
The data used in this paper is the result of a common European project with 
participation from Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK. We chose countries with a high level of economic 
development for reasons pertaining to availability of data, in order to avoid very large 
effects of different political regulation regimes upon the distribution of the creative 
class, and in order to avoid problems with integrating data from economically less-
developed countries with high urban primacy with countries with more perfect rank-
size urban hierarchies (for problems of incorporating less developed countries into 
such data sets, see Soo, 2005). 
Partners from all countries have participated developing the variables in the dataset to 
ensure the best possible homogeneity between the European countries as well as 
possibilities for comparability between European and North American analyses of the 
creative class. The source of the data varies between the European countries. Data for 
the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) is register data 
supplied by the national statistical bureaus, containing accurate information on the 
whole population. For the remaining countries, data is national census data supplied 
by the national statistical bureaus, containing information on a substantial and 
representative sample of the national populations. 
To ensure comparability between the European countries, city regions are used as unit 
of analysis. The European countries use slightly different definitions of a city region, 
however they all correspond to Eurostat’s NUTS 4 regions. 
The point of departure for each variable in the dataset is the indicators developed and 
presented by Florida (2002c) in his analyses of the creative class. This paper employs 
the following variables: 
• Population: Number of all inhabitants (residents). 
• The creative class: The share of the employed residents occupied within 
creative professions defined as ISCO: 211, 212, 213, 214, 221, 222, 231, 232, 
233, 234, 235, 243, 244, 247, 1, 223, 241, 242, 31, 32, 341, 342, 343, 345, 
346, 245, 3131, 347, 521. 
34 
• Cultural offer index: The number of employees in a city region working in 
industries with NACE: 80, 85. 
• Hi-tech jobs: the share of the employees in the city region, who work within 
hi-tech industries defined as NACE: 244, 300, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 333, 
334, 335, 341, 342, 343, 353, 642, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 731, 732, 
742, 743, 921. 
The creative class is further divided into three subgroups: 
• The creative core: The share of the employed residents occupied within 
specific (technical or educational) creative professions defined as ISCO: 211, 
212, 213, 214, 221, 222, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 243, 244, 247. 
• The creative professionals: The share of the employed residents occupied 
within specific (generic or managerial) creative professions defined as ISCO: 
1, 223, 241, 242, 31, 32, 341, 342, 343, 345, 346. 
• Bohemians: The share of the employed residents occupied within specific 
(artistic) creative professions defined as ISCO: 245, 3131, 347, 521. 
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Appendix 2: On the methods employed in calculating and plotting the 
distributions  
 
A rank-size distribution is a correlation of the size of a variable for a group of 
observations with the rank of those observations on the same variable. We have 
employed a quite mainstream method (see e.g. Gabaix, 2005; Gabaix and Ioannides, 
2003) in order to calculate and plot the distribution of the creative class, the general 
population, the cultural offer and high-tech jobs, among the 445 European cities.  
All cities were ordered by the value of the observation (i.e., of the number of 
members of the creative class, total population, employed in cultural industries, and 
employed in hi-tech industries ⎯  for definitions, see appendix 1). The largest 
observation was given rank 1, the second largest rank 2 etc. We plotted the values as a 
graphic plot, the log of the rank is placed on the y-axis and the log of the size of the 
corresponding observation on the x-axis. As noted by Gabraix and Ioannides (2003: 
6), perfect rank-size distributions should then appear as “.. something very close to a 
straight line.”  This is an indication that the distribution is scale free (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999). 
One may choose to cut off the lower tail of observations if it has no scale free 
distribution, in order to obtain a fit to a rank-size rule (Gabaix, 2005) ⎯  or, as in the 
case of our analysis where no cut-off was made, it may be necessary to split the 
distribution up into phases with better fit to the rank-size rule. Where to make the cut-
off point, or where to split the distribution into phases, is a matter of individual 
judgment. We have chosen to split the distributions into phases so as to maximize 
each phase’s correspondence between observed and predicted values ⎯  i.e., the 
adjusted R2 of the graph in each phase. For the R2 values achieved, please confer to 
tables 1, 3, and 4. 
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